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Whilst the English law of tort is generally favourable towards the psychiatric damage claims of primary victims, 
claims from secondary victims are treated in a much more restrictive manner. The leading case of Alcock v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Alcock) arising from the Hillsborough disaster establishes that 
amongst other things, secondary victims must overcome a number of control mechanisms in order to found a 
duty of care in negligence: There must be a close proximity of relationship with the immediate victim; and 
proximity in time, space and perception in relation to the shocking event. In relation to the means by which 
the shock is caused, the House of Lords in Alcock emphasised that perception was generally expected to be 
with one’s own unaided senses and that the viewing of a television broadcast of events would not normally 
suffice. However, the decades since the judgment have witnessed an explosion of new media platforms and 
technologies which have arguably transformed the dissemination of imagery. In light of this transformation, 
this article seeks to consider the implications of such technologies for the legal framework arising from Alcock, 
suggesting that the current approach fails to recognise the realities of the modern age in a number of ways. 
Looking to Australian jurisprudence as a basis for change, this article proposes how the law might be reformed 
to better reflect the contemporary world.   
 










I. INTRODUCTION: WHY REVISIT ALCOCK NOW? 
 
Described as ‘one of the greatest peacetime tragedies of the last century’,1 the basic account of the 
Hillsborough disaster is well known. On 15th April 1989, an FA Cup semi-final was scheduled between 
Liverpool and Nottingham Forest and over 50,000 football fans travelled to Hillsborough stadium to 
watch. Unable to attend, millions of others watched the match live on television or heard radio 
broadcasts and repeats of the event. Yet even before the match started it became apparent that the 
stadium was dangerously overcrowded at the Liverpool end. Just prior to kick-off, even more 
Liverpool fans were admitted through an exit-gate opened by the South Yorkshire Police. The 
additional numbers led to fatal overcrowding in the forward enclosures. Of the 96 fans who lost 
their lives, the youngest was just 10 years old. Hundreds of others were injured and still more were 
traumatised. In the years since the event, campaign groups have tirelessly fought for justice amid a 
growing suspicion of authorities deliberately deflecting blame and colluding with the press to mask 
their own culpabilities.2 Only recently has the fuller picture surrounding the disaster begun to 
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emerge, serving to bring the events of Hillsborough under a renewed spotlight. Prompted by 
manifest public anger at the 20th anniversary memorial event in Liverpool, the normal 30 year rule 
prohibiting the publication of certain official documents was waived and a fresh investigation was 
instituted by the Hillsborough Independent Panel.3 The Panel’s Report in 2012 revealed that there 
had indeed been a systematic attempt to cover up the police’s mistakes, including significant 
revision of police statements so as to remove references to inadequate police responses, leadership 
and communications.4 In response to the report, the Independent Police Complaint’s Commission 
has opened what is, at the time of writing, the largest inquiry ever conducted into alleged police 
criminality in England and Wales.5 The original inquest verdicts have also been overturned as a result 
of a legal challenge founded on the new evidence revealed by the Report, and new inquests were 
initiated.6 The results, published at the time of writing and attracting significant press coverage, 
found that the 96 victims were unlawfully killed.7 
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Whilst these recent events suggest fresh criminal action,8 the heightened focus on Hillsborough also 
suggests a timely opportunity to re-examine the disaster’s legacy for the law of negligence.9 The case 
of Alcock arose directly from Hillsborough, having been brought against the South Yorkshire Police 
by the loved ones of those who died at the stadium. Alcock provides the framework for the current 
law on recovery for psychiatric damage by secondary victims, these being those who suffer 
psychiatric damage through witnessing the negligent infliction of harm or the risk thereof on a loved 
one.10 In brief, Alcock established that in order for secondary victims to recover, psychiatric damage 
must be reasonably foreseeable, but claimants would also have to establish a close relationship with 
the immediate victim, plus proximity in time, space and perception in relation to the event. 11 In 
relation to the means by which the shock was caused, the viewing of events through live 
broadcasting in Alcock was not generally considered to be sufficient because recognisable suffering 
was not shown due to broadcasting codes of ethics, and the fact that the collage of viewpoints 
depicted by the media was not felt to be equivalent to personal perception. The disaster must be 
                                                          
8
 The headline ‘Hillsborough families to sue police for ‘abuse on industrial scale’ aptly captures the public 
sentiment at the time of writing in late April 2016. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/apr/28/hillsborough-families-to-sue-police-for-abuse-on-
industrial-scale The chief constable of the South Yorkshire police has been suspended, commentators consider 
his return to post unlikely: http://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/apr/28/is-south-yorkshire-police-
worth-saving-after-hillsborough 
9
 Whilst this article focuses on psychiatric damage claims, arguably the criminal review has wider relevance for 
tort law. As the original inquest verdicts are reviewed, arguably the case of Hicks v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police [1992] 2 All ER should be revisited due to fresh inquest evidence on time of deaths. Potential 
claims of misfeasance in public office and libel might also be considered. 
10
 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] AC 310. 
11
 On the distinction between primary and secondary victims see further White v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455; Page v Smith [1996] AC 155. The term ‘immediate victim’ is used to describe 
the person whose imperilment is witnessed by the secondary victim.   
5 
 
experienced directly, through the claimant’s own ‘unaided senses’.12  As stated by Lord Oliver, ‘The 
necessary element of proximity between plaintiff and defendant is furnished, at least in part, by 
both physical and temporal propinquity and also by the sudden and direct visual impression on the 
plaintiff’s mind of actually witnessing the event or its immediate aftermath.’13  
 
Yet arguably the reasoning in Alcock was influenced by the limited development of broadcasting 
technology at the time. This landscape is now profoundly transformed, not least by the near-
ubiquitous and unedited mass dispersal of images online. The hallmark of the contemporary disaster 
is blanket media coverage which is instantly uploaded and proliferated online in real time; high 
definition images which immediately reach us —  regardless of distance and location — and connect 
us to our loved ones through a multitude of platforms and on a range of increasingly sophisticated 
devices. Location technologies embedded in these devices alert us to precisely where our loved ones 
are, while tagging and automatic recognition apps zero in on their unique features.14 Particularly in 
times of disaster, the first response of governments and relief organisations as well as that of the 
wider populace is to turn to the smartphone and the internet for an understanding of events.15 As 
Giliker has recently observed, ‘Alcock was decided in November 1991 and technology has moved on. 
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It remains an interesting question to what extent the courts can continue to distinguish between the 
“unaided senses” of the secondary victim and the dispersal of live images through modern 
technology.’16 Engaging directly with this observation, this article seeks to consider the import of 
technological advances for Alcock’s control mechanisms in three stages. Firstly, it outlines the 
relevant law, giving particular attention to the requirements on the means by which the shock is 
caused. Secondly, it outlines relevant developments in new media and technology and explains how 
these challenge the legal position in Alcock. Thirdly, having identified the points of tension in the 
law, the article considers Australian jurisprudence, using it as a basis for suggesting reform to the 
domestic legal framework on psychiatric damage which would better reflect contemporary 
developments in technology. It concludes that reform along the lines of the Australian jurisprudence 
would arguably make the domestic law in this area more suitable and — more importantly given the 
rate of technological change — sustainable for the 21st century.  
 
II. Recovery for secondary victims: the development of the law 
 
In order to provide a framework for the discussion, it is first useful to outline the law on negligently 
inflicted psychiatric damage in relation to secondary victims. Whereas a primary victim is one who 
has suffered psychiatric damage as a result of being placed in immediate danger or in reasonable 
fear thereof, a secondary victim may be described as being ‘once removed’ from the event, suffering 
psychiatric damage because of witnessing the infliction of physical injury (or the risk of such) upon a 
loved one. The claims of primary victims are more readily admitted than those of secondary 
victims.17 To establish the existence of a duty of care, the claimant must show not only that it is 
reasonably foreseeable that they would be harmed by the defendant’s negligence but also that 
there is sufficient proximity between the claimant and the defendant. Where the claimant is 
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immediately involved in a disaster, i.e. as a primary victim, proximity is not normally considered to 
be problematic.18 However, in the case of secondary victims, the courts have feared the prospect of 
open-ended liability, thus in addition to a higher foreseeability threshold (namely that psychiatric 
damage would have been suffered by a person of ordinary fortitude in the circumstances), a number 
of control mechanisms, variously couched in the language of proximity and specific to secondary 
victims, have also been laid down so as to confine the scope of the duty of care.19  
 
Until Alcock, the best conspectus of the law in this area was located in the case of McLoughlin, which 
concerned a mother whose husband and children had been involved in a car crash.20 She had not 
witnessed the event itself, but, upon learning of the crash from a friend, had travelled to the hospital 
where she was informed that her daughter was dead. Her surviving family members were also at the 
hospital, which was where she found them; distressed, dishevelled, dirty and bloodstained. 
Witnessing this harrowing scene had caused her to suffer psychiatric damage. The Court in 
McLoughlin confirmed that foreseeability alone was not enough to ground a duty of care. More was 
required. Specifically, their Lordships said, careful consideration had to be given to three 
independent considerations, namely (1) the class of persons whose claims ought to be recognised; 
(2) the proximity of the claimants to the traumatic event, and (3) the means by which the shock was 
caused.  
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In relation to (1) the class of persons those claims ought to be recognised (this being the question of 
proximity of relationship) the Court recognised a spectrum of claims. According to Lord Wilberforce:  
 
As regards the class of persons, the possible range is between the closest of family ties – of 
parent and child, or husband and wife – and the ordinary bystander. Existing law recognises 
the claims of the first: it denies the claims of the second, either on the basis that such persons 
must be assumed to be possessed of fortitude sufficient to enable them to endure the 
calamities of modern life, or that defendants cannot be expected to compensate the world at 
large…it should follow that other cases involving less close relationships must be carefully 
scrutinised. I cannot say that they should never be admitted. The closer the tie (not merely in 
relationship, but in care) the greater the claim for consideration.21  
 
In any case, a claim would also have to be evaluated in light of (2) the proximity of the claimant to 
the traumatic event. Lord Wilberforce stated that ‘As regards proximity to the accident, it is obvious 
that this must be close in both time and space…Experience has shown that to insist on direct and 
immediate sight or hearing would be impractical and unjust and that under what may be called the 
“aftermath” doctrine one who, from close proximity, comes very soon upon the scene should not be 
excluded.’22  The limits of the “immediate aftermath” were not precisely defined in the case but 
were held on the facts to cover the claimant personally witnessing her family around two hours after 
the accident in essentially the same state as they would have been at the site of the accident itself.23  
 
Regarding (3) the means by which the damage was caused, it was reiterated that the law did not 
compensate for psychiatric damage that arose from third party communication. Lord Wilberforce 
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stated that ‘The shock must come through the sight or hearing of the event or of its immediate 
aftermath. Whether some equivalent of sight or hearing, e.g. through simultaneous television, 
would suffice may have to be considered.’24   
 
In declining to extend the law further, the court was clearly motivated by policy considerations. 
Quoting Dean Prosser, Lord Wilberforce noted that the arguments were best encapsulated as 
follows: ‘the reluctance of the courts to enter this field even where the mental injury is clearly 
foreseeable, and the frequent mention of difficulties of proof, the facility of fraud, and the problem 
of finding a place to stop and draw the line, suggest that here it is the nature of the interest invaded 
and the type of damage which is the real obstacle.’25 The Court noted that since Dean Prosser’s 
comments times had changed, so for example the type of damage was now more familiar, 
fraudulent claims and evidentiary issues could be dealt with by the courts, and the scarcity of cases 
combined with the modest sums awarded suggested that the floodgates fear was exaggerated. 
However, these objections aside, Lord Wilberforce was still of the view that as psychiatric damage 
could affect a wide range of people, the additional restrictions in the area were justified.26  
 
It was against this background that the claims in Alcock were to be determined. A total of 10 cases 
were examined by the House of Lords, claims which encompassed a complex matrix of 
circumstances. Certain claimants were at the ground but in enclosures some distance from their 
loved ones. They had witnessed the disaster unfolding at first hand but did not see the actual 
infliction of injury to their relatives, learning of their deaths some eight or more hours after the 
event either by telephone or from identifying their bodies in the temporary mortuary that had been 
set up at the site. Other claimants were not present at the event but either saw the scene unfold on 
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live television or learnt of it from later radio and television coverage of the disaster. They feared for 
their loved ones whom they knew were at the match, but again learnt only later of their deaths from 
being informed by the police or friends, and/or subsequently identifying their bodies in the 
mortuary. The personal connections of the claimants to the deceased also varied. The relatives 
included parents, siblings, grandparents, an uncle, a brother-in-law and a fiancée. In the light of 
McLoughlin, their Lordships in Alcock had to determine the question, considering (1) whether the 
relationships in the present case were sufficiently close, (2) if the time limits came within the 
concept of the immediate aftermath, and (3) whether perception via live television might be 
considered equivalent to direct sight or hearing. What emerges from the judgments is a complicated 
Venn diagram of requirements in which none of the claimants, on the facts of their individual cases, 
could be placed at the centre. 
 
In terms of how to define proximity of relationship, it was held in Alcock that the core requirements 
of McLoughlin still represented the accepted position. Lord Keith was of the view that he would not 
seek to limit the class by reference to the set categories of presumptive closeness (these being 
parental and spousal) in McLoughlin.27 Where broader relationships were in question, he espoused 
the view that in each case the closeness of the tie would need to be proven by the claimant. In the 
case itself, as no specific evidence of particularly close ties of affection was put forward for the 
remoter relationships, these claims failed.28  
 
Proximity in time and space to the event or its immediate aftermath had also to be satisfied. Two of 
the plaintiffs, who had lost brothers and a brother-in-law, were actually at the event. Perhaps 
surprisingly, their presence at the ground did not suffice. Only one plaintiff who was at the match 
also found his loved one at the scene, but this was some eight hours later, when he identified his 
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brother-in-law’s body at the temporary mortuary. Although this might be thought capable of falling 
within the ‘aftermath’, Lord Ackner thought otherwise.29 Given that McLoughlin’s case was 
considered to be on the margins of recovery, he did not feel that post-accident identification cases, 
where identification happened after eight hours at the earliest, would be permissible.30 For Lord 
Jauncey, a distinction could be drawn between the circumstances of Alcock and McLoughlin as, in 
the latter, the mother encountered her family very soon after the incident in the same condition as 
they would have been at the roadside, whereas the purpose and timings of the visits to the 
mortuary in Alcock were different, being for identification as opposed to rescue and comfort, and 
some eight to nine hours later.31 The other claimant was informed of his two brothers’ death the 
next day by telephone, following a fruitless personal search on the day of the disaster. His claim, too, 
was unsuccessful. Neither claimant had established a sufficiently close relationship with the 
immediate victim, nor, as Lord Oliver observed, was their presence at the ground sufficient to 
establish the necessary proximity in time and space.32  
 
It will be recalled that McLoughlin had been generous in extending the temporal and spatial limits of 
the event to encompass its ‘immediate aftermath’ but had passed over the question of whether its 
perception via live television would be considered equivalent to direct sight or hearing.33 Whilst the 
view that it should met with favour in the High Court, it was rejected in the Court of Appeal and 
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House of Lords, where such arguments were unanimously declined.34 Lord Keith found that viewing 
live television scenes did not provide the requisite proximity or sudden sense of shock that the law 
demanded. Lord Keith stated that in the cases where perception was via television: 
 
none of these depicted suffering of recognisable individuals, such being excluded by the 
broadcasting code of ethics, a position known to the defendant. In my opinion the viewing of 
these scenes cannot be equiperated with the viewer being within “sight or hearing of the 
event or of its immediate aftermath,” to use the words of Lord Wilberforce [1993] 1 A.C. 410, 
423B, nor can the scenes reasonably be regarded as giving rise to shock, in the sense of a 
sudden assault on the nervous system. They were capable of giving rise to anxiety for the 
safety of relatives…and undoubtedly did so, but that is very different from seeing the fact of 
the relative or his condition shortly after the event. The viewing of the television scenes did 
not create the necessary degree of proximity.35  
 
Lord Ackner broadly agreed, considering that any depiction of recognisable suffering would 
constitute a novus actus interveniens, breaking the causal chain between the defendant’s alleged 
breach of duty and the claimants’ loss:  
 
it is common ground that it was clearly foreseeable by the defendant that the scenes at 
Hillsborough would be broadcast live and that amongst those who would be watching would 
be parents and spouses and other relatives and friends of those in the pens behind the 
goal…However he would also know of the code of ethics which the television authorities 
televising this event could be expected to follow, namely that they would not show pictures of 
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suffering by recognisable individuals. Had they done so, Mr. Hytner accepted that this would 
have been a “novus actus”…As the defendant was reasonably entitled to expect to be the 
case, there were no such pictures.36 
 
Drawing on obiter comments from Lord Nolan in the Court of Appeal, Lord Ackner envisaged that in 
exceptional circumstances, recovery by viewing simultaneous television images might be 
entertained, such as for example if a publicity-seeking organisation were to show a live broadcast of 
a children’s balloon ride bursting into flames, but it is evident that he did not view the disaster 
before him as coming into such a category.37 Lord Jauncey declined to comment on the possibility of 
the door being left open to television claims, but agreed that in the present case the defendants 
could expect that in accordance with television guidelines, individual suffering would not be shown, 
and concluded that the fact of editing, commentary and a collage of viewpoints that could not 
represent what any one person could see on their own served to reinforce his decision that 
television could not be considered as furnishing the requisite proximity.38 Lord Oliver also declined 
to accept the television claims on the grounds that aggregated and gradual perception arising from 
viewing televised scenes was not the same as immediate sight or hearing of the event. In the cases 
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before him the shock had not been originated by the perception of the television scenes themselves, 
and whilst they might have contributed to a ‘matrix for imagined consequences’ founding a dawning 
realisation of disaster over time, they did not provide the immediacy of impression or ‘shock’ that 
the proximity tests required.39 In the words of Lord Oliver:  
 
These images provided no doubt the matrix for imagined consequences giving rise to grave 
concern and worry, followed by a dawning consciousness over an extended period that the 
imagined consequence has occurred, finally confirmed by the death and, in some cases, 
subsequent visual identification of the victim. The trauma is created in part by such 
confirmation and in part by the linking in the mind of that confirmation to the previously 
absorbed image. To extend the notion of proximity in cases of immediately created nervous 
shock to this more elongated and, to some extent, retrospective process may seem a logical 
analogical development. But, as I shall endeavour to show, the law in this area is not wholly 
logical and whilst having every sympathy with the plaintiffs…I cannot for my part see any 
pressing reason of policy for taking this further step along a road which must ultimately lead 
to virtually limitless liability.40  
 
If mediated perception were to be accepted, Lord Oliver was of the view that this was a step for 
Parliament to take, with the proper opportunity for public debate and consultation.41  
 
III. New media technology and the means by which the shock is caused: Some challenges 
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Since Alcock, over two decades have passed without legislative intervention, with the result that the 
case still represents the current law. Recommendations suggested by the English Law Commission’s 
1998 report remain unadopted.42 Looking forwards, there appears to be no legislative intervention 
on the horizon, as the Government’s most recent comment on the matter has been to express a 
preference for judicial development of the law.43 However, it is arguable that the law is now wholly 
unsatisfactory.  Developments in new media technology postdating the case suggest that the Alcock 
framework, particularly the generic and default exclusion of live television claims, increasingly fails 
to match the contemporary realities of a culture which is not just dominated but arguably defined by 
new media technology and the proliferation of live and unedited imagery.44 For post-internet, 
smartphone and ‘selfie’ generations,45 the differences between the present technological landscape 
and that of Alcock may not be readily appreciated, but are they unquestionably profound. The 
disaster’s contemporaneous incident reports, which describe the rapid meltdown of the relief 
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effort’s communication networks and the frantic attempts of relatives to get information with only 
land line telephones at the nearby Vicarage and Youth Club to depend on, provide the starkest 
illustration of the changes.46 At the time of writing, technology is in a phase of such rapid transition 
that it has moved from beyond the portable in the form of smartphones to the wearable (such as 
Google Glass) and even the implantable, where technologies can now become embedded in the 
flesh to augment or replace the sensory organs. Recognising and accepting such technology as 
accurately representative of everyday life and/or the likely shape of things to come, the next section 
in this article considers whether the law per Alcock can nowadays be regarded as appropriate. As 
noted above, the denial of live television claims is broadly based on two lines of reasoning. The first 
is that broadcasts would not depict any identifiable suffering, due to compliance with the 
broadcasting codes of ethics. The second is that the requirement of viewing a collage of images and 
commentary of the disaster or its immediate aftermath is not the same as viewing it with one’s own 
unaided senses. Both lines of argument are clearly underpinned by a third consideration, this being 
the fear of opening the floodgates. These issues will be examined in turn.  
 
A. The impact of technology on broadcasters, codes of ethics and identifiable suffering  
 
At the time of the Hillsborough disaster there were two television broadcasters, these being the BBC 
and ITV. Between them they provided just three terrestrial services. However, what we understand 
by a ‘broadcast’ and a ‘broadcaster’ in the present day is arguably more complicated than in the era 
of Alcock, as there are now many more modes of broadcasting and more broadcasters, if 
broadcasting — a concept not discussed in any significant detail in Alcock - is understood as the 
transmission of images. A veritable explosion of live visual imagery has emerged as a result of the 
deregulation of the traditional broadcasting sector and the entry into the market of online content 
platforms and social media sites such as Facebook and YouTube. 2015 alone saw the simultaneous 
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launch of two live streaming video apps — Meerkat and Periscope - both linking directly to Twitter 
feeds.47 Such online broadcasting apps are by no means trivial alternatives to established televisual 
reporting. Twitter is estimated to have around 500 million users, with the same number of tweets 
per day. It is also estimated that if Facebook were a nation, it would be the world’s third most 
populous.  YouTube boasts over 1 billion unique users every month and 300 hours of video uploaded 
every minute.48 The emergence of ‘Smart television’ (internet content received on a traditional 
television with internet capability) further blurs the line between traditional broadcast reception and 
online content. 
 
The advent of citizen journalism combined with the new media platforms further serves to 
complicate the question of who the broadcaster is and what precisely is being broadcast. The term 
citizen journalism describes ‘the spontaneous actions of ordinary people, caught up in extraordinary 
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on YouTube see http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/statistics.html 
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events, who [feel] compelled to adopt the role of a news reporter’.49 Contemporary disasters are 
increasingly characterised by graphic smartphone coverage from citizen journalists, material which is 
broadcast instantaneously and ubiquitously as journalism moves in ever-accelerated frequencies: 
‘from the weekly to the daily paper, from the nightly news to rolling news, and with the liveness of 
satellite TV now competing with Bloomberg terminals and Twitter for the fastest possible circulation 
of updates and information’.50 Experience is showing that coverage from citizen journalism, such as 
that of the 7/7 bombings, is not only instrumental but increasingly definitive of global events.51 Non-
state and non-commercial outlets increasingly threaten to eclipse traditional television as the 
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 C Greer and E McLaughlin, ‘We predict a riot? Public order policing, new media environments and the rise of 
the citizen journalist’ British Journal of Criminology (2010) 1041 at 1045 citing Allan and Thorsen; A Reading, 
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(2010) 25 (1), 89; A Ekström, ‘Exhibiting Disasters: mediation, historicity and spectatorship’ Media, Culture, 
Society 2013 (34), 472; Z Tufecki and C Wilson, ‘Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: 
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Privately Public: Social Networking on YouTube’ (2008) 13, 361; T Dwyer, Media Convergence  (2010, OUP); G 
Meikle and S Young, Media Convergence: Networked Digital Media in Everyday Life (2012: Palgrave 
Macmillan).  
50
 Meikle and Young fn 49 above, citing McNair and Hartley.  
51
 Greer and McLaughlin, fn 49 above. The apparent footage of the Germanwings air disaster and the 
broadcast of the Walter Scott shooting give the most recent illustration of the point. Indeed, news via social 
media may increasingly outpace information from public officials such as the police, especially in tragic 
circumstances, see eg http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3114110/Father-tragic-Amber-Peat-learned-
13-year-old-daughter-run-away-home-read-Facebook.html. More recently in relation to the Shoreham Air 
disaster (footage of which was widely available on social media) several policemen resigned following their 




primary channel of information as opposed to just providing those broadcasters with minor 
elements of newsfeed. As Meikle and Young note, whereas the traditional understanding of 
broadcast media signifies a distinct organisation who is responsible for the content of the broadcast, 
contemporary media is more in the nature of a dialogue than a one-way dissemination of 
information.52 With Wikileaks being memorably described as ‘the world’s first stateless news 
organisation’, it is clear that broadcasting is no longer the exclusive prerogative of the 
establishment.53 
 
Some television broadcasting organisations (such as established national channels) have established 
user-generated content hubs which may have some degree of editorial control, whilst vast numbers 
of other online live imagery and information outlets do not organise material in such a manner and 
lack any effective oversight at all, nor do they necessarily appear to come under the existing 
regulatory and ethical framework of television broadcasting.54 The shift from traditional television 
broadcasting to social media means that editing is what now happens after (as opposed to before) 
an event is aired, if indeed there is any editing at all. Indeed, recognising the growing phenomenon 
of citizen journalism, certain user-generated content platforms overtly and explicitly acknowledge 
that violent or graphic content may be both inevitable and unavoidable, and simply request that 
such imagery is sufficiently contextualised and not uploaded gratuitously or for sensationalism as 
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 Meikle and Young, fn 49 above, pp 54-55. 
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 Meikle and Young, fn 49 above, p 8. Wikileaks is a non-profit news organisation which releases anonymous 
information and source material to a global audience. According to its website it has released more classified 
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 See further Reading, fn 49 above, who cites, amongst others, Yahoo!’s ‘youwitnessnews’ hub which is 
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part of a broad ‘community standards’ agreement.55 More longstanding standards themselves may 
be questioned, in that from a post-Leveson perspective, the ethical frameworks of the traditional 
media itself are arguably of little relevance, strength or efficacy and are customs more honoured in 
the breach than in the observance.56 In sum, the current lack of editorial control across the media 
spectrum in its entirety significantly undermines the assumptions made in Alcock that a degree of 
restraint would be exercised and could be readily and reasonably relied upon.  
 
Developments in media hardware also serve to challenge the suitability of the Alcock stance on 
perception for the contemporary age, in that the state of hardware at the time of the decision bears 
little if any relation to the viewing apparatus now available. In the 1980s, broadcast images were of 
relatively poor quality typically viewed on 14-inch cathode ray tube sets. It was thus not entirely 
illogical to insist that the unaided senses might provide a more vivid and traumatic impression of 
events. However, contemporary technological advances have arguably completely transformed the 
viewing experience. 3D and ultra-high definition screens measuring larger than a king-sized bed are 
now available for use in the private home, whilst stadium televisions can accommodate over 20,500 
                                                          
55
 See, for example, the guidance and user agreements on violent and graphic content on YouTube, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802008  Meerkat’s Rules are apparently 8 lines long and 
include the following: ‘Streams will be pushed to followers in real time via push notifications…everything is 
live, no reruns…everyone can watch on the web. Be kind.’ http://meerkatapp.co/rules 
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following revelations of widespread phone hacking in 2011. It was largely condemnatory of the way in which 




square feet of HD LED lights broadcasting around 5 million pixels and 280 trillion colours, bringing an 
unparalleled level of intensity and detail to live broadcasting.57  
 
Alcock’s dated terminology of ‘television’ is further challenged by the advent of smartphone and 
mobile devices, which are becoming increasingly prevalent as a mode of viewing, being used for half 
of YouTube views.58 Mobile devices mean that the act of viewing is no longer tethered to a single 
static or private/domestic geographical location. As Meikle and Young note, ‘mobile phones enact a 
breaking open of public and private spaces…the private can always intrude into any social 
environment now. There is no social space that can’t be privatized with a phone’.59 The current era is 
characterised by the obsessive online documenting or ‘compulsory communication’ of the self and 
the phenomenon of ‘omni-accessibility’ — a term which describes a state of near-permanent 
contactability and connectivity.60 In the present day, any emerging disaster is thus more than likely 
to be viewed synchronously and in detail on a multitude of sophisticated viewing technologies and 
from a multitude of providers with questionable or non-existent editorial control; a prospect that is 
far removed from the circumstances of Alcock.  
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Added to the ubiquity of live imagery described above and lack of editorial oversight, developments 
in imaging and location technology further bring into question whether the showing of recognisable 
suffering will be necessarily or easily avoided. Facial recognition and biometric apps are now 
increasingly popular as integral features of smartphones, as are phone location technologies, 
targeted feed push and tailored news subscriptions which update us in real time on our preferred 
individuals and interests.61 RFID tags and other wearable technologies as well as advances in 
biomedical engineering such as fitbits, subdermal implants, smart watches, smart heart monitors 
and smart tattoos (flat, stretchable micro-electronic sensors which can be used to monitor the 
electrical signals of the heart, brain and muscular system) can also help to accurately pinpoint an 
individual’s precise physical co-ordinates and wellbeing.62 As noted by Lee, ‘the social networks are 
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 See eg Facebook facial recognition app https://www.facebook.com/facialrecognitionapp ; Family locator and 
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leading the way towards Total Information Awareness’, a phrase which aptly describes the qualities 
that contemporary communications technologies can bring to us in terms of our comprehension of 
unfolding events.63 Indeed, some of these technologies are already being depended upon in disaster 
scenarios in order to aid and co-ordinate relief efforts and government agencies, with the result that 
it is now entirely feasible if not increasingly likely that the face - and fate - of a loved one can be 
accurately tracked anywhere, in real time and in high-definition throughout the course of a single 
catastrophe.64  The proliferation of media images and developments in technology discussed here 
clearly challenge the desirability and practicality of excluding live imagery claims in the modern age.  
 
Once the insistence on direct perception is abandoned, the requirement that there be close spatial 
and temporal proximity to the accident is also uncoupled, as it makes little sense to permit some 
claimants to recover by viewing events live but miles away, whilst simultaneously insisting others 
must directly and immediately apprehend the scene or aftermath in person. If these objections are 
accepted, the logic insisting on the restriction to ‘live’ images only is also brought into question. To 
admit cases on the basis of seeing repeats raises the spectre of floodgates and removes the 
requirement of ‘sudden shock’, a prospect met with short shrift in Alcock. However, it is now well 
established that medical understandings of psychiatric damage do not turn on particular modes or 
timings of perception, and accepting that shock may be gradual.65 In the current context, even in 
small countries families are increasingly geographically dispersed due to pressures of work, housing 
or educational opportunities and are thus ever more likely to rely on social media to sustain their 
ties of love and affection.66 Likewise, even the most intimate relationships are now frequently 
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initiated and maintained online as part of an effort to overcome physical distance. Thus to insist on 
direct perception and proximity in time and space is not only to ignore the proliferation of live 
imagery in general but also a failure to recognise the specific and central role it plays in maintaining 
family life and close relationships.67  
 
In Alcock, it will be recalled that the depiction of identifiable suffering would be seen as a novus 
actus interveniens - a new and intervening act that would break the chain of causation between the 
defendant’s act and the claimant’s harm. As stated in the Oropesa, ‘[t]he question is not whether 
there was new negligence, but whether there was a new cause…To break the chain of causation it 
must be shown that there is something which I will call ultroneous, something unwarrantable, a new 
cause which disturbs the sequence of events, something which can be described as either 
unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic.’68 Yet the arguments above surely beg the question as to 
whether the graphic and unedited broadcasting of a disaster is, in any way, realistically 
unforeseeable, or indeed unreasonable. On the contrary, in the current context it is surely 
something that is not only probable but highly likely to be the case, and as observed in Street on 
Torts, ‘the more foreseeable the intervening cause, the more likely that the court will not treat it as 
breaking the chain of causation.’69  
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B. The impact of technology on viewing the event or immediate aftermath with the unaided 
senses 
 
Further challenges to the Alcock framework are provided by other advances in technology which 
bring into question whether the ‘unaided senses’ will continue to be a meaningful category. Such 
technologies promise to disturb significantly the formerly clear division between the aided and 
unaided senses - a division which is crucial to the guidelines in Alcock. Such technologies, grouped 
under the broad heading of ‘augmented reality’, may describe portable or wearable apps and 
technology that provide real-time enhancement of the everyday environment via smartphones and 
watches, as well as similar technologies that are more closely integrated with current prosthetics 
such as glasses and contact lenses so as to overlay the senses with digital information to produce 
further layers of information in the world’s perception.70  
 
Perhaps the best current example of wearable augmented reality technology is the Google Glass, 
which was launched in 2013. Google Glass describes a computer integrated into glasses which 
enables the wearer to view a screen within their usual field of vision. The glasses have Bluetooth and 
Wi-Fi connectivity and a tiny computer inside the frame enables the wearer to instruct software by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the House of Lords - gave a detailed analysis of the complexity of media perception. Given the popularity of 
the Hillsborough match, in his words, (at pp 343-344) ‘it was not merely reasonably foreseeable, it was a 
pound to a penny that…the television sets of the city would have been switched on and eagerly watched for 
the latest news’. In the current contexts, these are odds which can only be increasing. 
70
 On augmented reality see eg http://www.theguardian.com/technology/augmented-reality 
 For augmented humanity studies, see the Augmented Human International Conference series and the newly-
instituted (2016) Springer’s Augmented Human Research Journal which covers such things as: Exoskeletons; 
human sensory substitution and fusion, and interactions between augmented humans and smart cities. 
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voice command, for example to film or take a picture through a 5 megapixel camera, whilst other 
apps available enable operation by motion such as winking, or can provide facial recognition 
features, being in essence a stripped-down version of a smartphone worn as spectacles. According 
to Google, the Glass’s high resolution display is ‘equivalent [to] a 25 inch high definition screen from 
eight feet away’.71 More recently Google have moved to patent the smart contact lens, which aims 
to incorporate the benefits of the Google Glass in a more wearable form, with the added benefits of 
ocular health monitoring as well as augmentation features such as facial recognition features for the 
visually impaired.72  
 
Implantable technologies, which may fully or partially replace particular sensory organs in the body 
and are which linked directly into the body’s neurosystem, may also be considered. One example of 
such technology is the development of a miniature telescope which is implantable into the eye in a 
similar manner to an artificial lens, and which projects images in the field of view onto receptive 
areas in the eye.73 Externally worn biomedical technologies that connect with the brain via 
implanted microchips are also being developed in order to replace or augment senses affected by 
disease or injury.74 Given the current trajectory of technological development towards wearables, as 
well as an increasing acceptance of piercing, tattooing and body modification, it is by no means 
outlandish that augmented reality technologies, both wearable and implantable, will move beyond 
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the medical sphere and become more mainstream as physical enhancements as much as disability 
and/or medical aids, leaving the concept of ‘unaided’ senses increasingly redundant.  
 
C. Challenging the policy arguments in Alcock 
 
Policy arguments against extending the scope of the duty of care have long been discussed in cases 
concerning secondary victims. To recap, in McLoughlin, four factors were identified, namely (1) 
floodgates and the risk of fraudulent claims; (2) the risk of imposing damages on the defendant that 
were disproportionate to the negligent conduct; (3) the risk of increasing evidentiary difficulties and 
length of litigation and (4) the need for legislation as opposed to judicial development of the law. It 
will be recalled that the Court in McLoughlin itself accepted the increasing challenge to the last three 
factors, but reiterated the force of the first. The fear of opening the door to a mass of claims and 
extending the law ‘in a direction where there is no pressing policy need and in which there is no 
logical stopping point’ is a persistent concern, clearly underpinning the ratio of Alcock.75  
 
With regard to the apparent lack of logical stopping point, it is arguable that abandoning the 
insistence of direct and immediate viewing of the event/aftermath with the unaided senses would 
not throw the floodgates open. It is worth recalling that it would not be everybody viewing every 
disaster that would be able to claim. Whilst there is a plethora of suitably horrific events to view 
online, only those events occasioned by the defendant’s negligence would initially found an action. 
For those cases, it is arguable that the secondary victim’s higher threshold of reasonable 
foreseeability would provide an initial hurdle to overcome. The requirement that the claimant must 
suffer a recognised kind of psychiatric harm would provide a further filter on claims, as would the 
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requirement of a close proximity of relationship to the immediate victim.76 The law of limitations 
would also protect the defendant from claims raised too long after the event. 
 
The appeal of the floodgates argument as a limiting device can also be challenged. The floodgates 
argument has long been subject to extensive critique, much of which is relevant here.77 As Stevens 
has observed in a trenchant critique of the use of policy by the judiciary, the Court in Alcock have, to 
all intents and purposes, effectively acted by legislative fiat to deny claimants their prima facie 
rights; a role that is more properly taken by Parliament.78 As in similar cases where policy is used to 
deny claims, no empirical evidence is furnished to support the conclusion that the floodgates would 
be opened and the argument stands by virtue of its rhetorical force alone.79 As Lord Oliver himself 
observed in Alcock, ‘the concept of ‘proximity’ is an artificial one which depends more on the court's 
perception of what is the reasonable area for the imposition of liability than on any logical process of 
analogical deduction’.80 
  
We may also look to the broader aims of the law to support a move away from the restrictive 
position in Alcock. As Lord Bingham has suggested (writing extra-judicially), the primary function of 
tort law, apart from its deterrent function, is to secure compensation for those who have had their 
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rights violated.81 If this principle is accepted, the denial of claims by virtue of their apprehended (as 
opposed to actual) volume appears to run counter to the primary purpose of the law. As large scale 
disasters, by definition, potentially involve a wide range of people, raising a floodgates objection to 
prevent a large number of people from claiming from the outset seems particularly unfair.  Newark 
has observed (in a different context, although arguably relevant here) that ‘if a hundred private 
wrongs have been done a hundred private actions may well be brought’, 82 but if this is accepted, 
given that Alcock itself demonstrates that consolidated cases can be brought for a single incident, we 
might question the actual volume of litigation that the courts would realistically face. Moreover, in X 
v Bedfordshire, the Court has argued that '[I]t would require very potent considerations of public 
policy…to override the rule of public policy which has first claim on the loyalty of the law: that 
wrongs should be remedied.’83 The contemporary context surely calls for a rebalancing of the policy 
considerations in Alcock so as to favour the paramount principle of remedying wrongs.   
 
IV. Reforming the law 
 
A. The Australian Jurisprudence  
 
Thus far, it has been suggested that the Alcock framework is inadequate on a number of grounds. 
Developments in new technology mean that the control mechanisms of proximity in time and space, 
as well as perception via the unaided senses ought to be abandoned. Policy considerations 
underpinning these restrictions have also been critiqued. In this section, the article looks to the 
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Australian jurisprudence to augment the arguments in favour of abandoning the insistence on 
sudden shock; direct, unaided perception, and, by extension, proximity in time and space. 
  
Australian law has been sent down a different path to that of domestic law following the case of 
Annetts.84 Annetts concerned a boy of 16 who had left his home in August 1986 in New South Wales 
to be a cattlehand on a station in Western Australia. His parents, worried by his inexperience, were 
assured by his employers that he would be working under close supervision on the station. However, 
a short time into his employment he was sent to work alone on another station 100km away. 
Apparently unable to cope with the isolation, he ran away. In December, the police telephoned his 
parents to inform them that he was missing. His father collapsed upon hearing the news, and his 
mother had to continue the conversation. At the turn of the year his parents had a number of 
telephone conversations with the police and other agencies and in the months that followed, the 
parents visited the area a number of times, during which they were shown some of their son’s 
possessions, including a bloodstained hat. In April 1987, they were informed by telephone that 
skeletal remains had been found by their son’s abandoned vehicle. Upon travelling to a police 
station nearby the ranch, they identified the remains as those of their son. He had died in the desert 
in early December from dehydration, exhaustion and hypothermia.  
 
A preliminary issue was whether there was a duty of care to avoid negligently inflicted psychiatric 
damage, a duty which was dismissed on appeal by the Full Court of Western Australia, who declined 
it in part because there was a lack of sudden and direct sensory perception of events as the 
claimants were separated in time and space from what occurred, and learnt of his disappearance 
and death by telephone.85 Yet in disagreeing with the Full Court, the High Court considered that 
unlike the English position, which remains governed by Alcock, the Australian law did not - and 
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should not - recognise sudden shock and direct perception as preconditions of liability. Such 
requirements, it was observed, had operated in a capricious and arbitrary manner, being 
‘unprincipled distinctions and artificial mechanisms [which brought] the law into disrepute’.86 As 
emphasised by the High Court:  
 
A rule that renders liability in negligence for psychiatric harm conditional on the geographic or 
temporal distance of the plaintiff from the distressing phenomenon, or on the means by which 
the plaintiff acquires knowledge of that phenomenon, is apt to produce arbitrary outcomes 
and to exclude meritorious claims…The rule is also disjoined from the realities of modern 
telecommunications which have developed greatly since this control factor was propounded.87  
 
Such statements echo the comments of Kirby P in the earlier case of Coates (also concerned with 
telephone communications), which emphasise that the contemporary context must inform how 
proximity is understood:  
 
The rule of actual perception is in part a product of nineteenth century notions of psychology 
and psychiatry. In part, it was intended as a shield of policy against expanding the liability of 
wrongdoers for the harm they caused. And in part, it was a reflection of nineteenth century 
modes of communicating information... [Direct perception] is … hopelessly out of contact with 
the modem [sic] world of telecommunications. If any judge has doubts about this, he or she 
should wander through the city streets and see the large number of persons linked by mobile 
telephones to the world about them. Inevitably such telephones may bring, on occasion, 
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shocking news, as immediate to the senses of the recipient as actual sight and sound of 
catastrophe would be. This is the reality of the world in which the law of nervous shock must 
now operate.88 
 
Of course, the reality of the communications world as described in Coates and Annetts has been 
further eclipsed by the internet age and has moved from the aural to the visual; a fact that makes 
the observations in those cases even more compelling.  
 
B. Methods of reform – incrementalism or something more radical? 
 
Whilst the Australian jurisprudence is thus set on a more sensible path, the difficulty apparently 
besetting the domestic position is that we are to go ‘thus far and no further’,89 bound as we are by 
Alcock. Yet the cry of ‘no further’ is somewhat undermined by the fact that whilst the courts have 
continually emphasised that to engage in judicial activism in this field is simply not within their gift, 
they have made notable incremental advances when cases have come before the lower courts. In 
Walters, the claimant’s baby was subject to negligent misdiagnosis, as a result of which he suffered a 
major epileptic seizure and irreparable brain damage.90 As he would have no quality of life, his life 
support was terminated and he died in his mother’s arms some 36 hours after the initial seizure. 
Although at first instance it was held that a 36 hour period could not amount to a single horrifying 
event, the Court of Appeal was prepared to consider the event as a whole, thus stretching the 
‘sudden shock’ concept. A liberal approach was again seen in Galli-Atkinson, where the court was 
prepared to accept that a series of events stretching over several hours might be considered as the 
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‘immediate aftermath’.91 In the case, a mother had learned of her daughter’s death in a road 
accident from a police officer at the scene. Upon being informed of her daughter’s death, she was 
taken on her request to see the body in the mortuary. At this stage, it was evident that she was in 
denial. When she viewed her daughter’s body, although the worst injuries were hidden, it was 
clearly disfigured and distorted. Guided by the approach in Walters, the Court found that unlike the 
situation in Alcock, where the visit to the mortuary was for identification, the events before them 
could be viewed (arguably somewhat artificially) as an uninterrupted sequence and as such could all 
be considered part of the immediate aftermath where the visit to the mortuary provided the last 
piece of a picture that the mother did not want to believe. Arguably the willingness to view 
psychiatric damage as founded by aggregated moments of perception in Walters and Galli-Atkinson 
might be seen as the start of a move away from a rigid insistence on sudden shock and immediate 
and direct perception of events. 
 
In the more recent case of Taylor, the Court reviewed the long-held judicial sense of dissatisfaction 
with the law that has been in place since Alcock yet reiterates its conclusion that incrementalism 
cannot provide the answer and that reform should be left to Parliament.92 Yet Parliament has clearly 
provided its response in deliberately and consistently electing not to act. It has overtly stated a 
preference for judicial development of the law in this field.93 As Oliphant notes, the passivity of the 
judiciary in the face of ‘blatantly unsatisfactory outcomes’ is extremely regrettable: ‘Faced with such 
intransigence, it might well to remind ourselves of who created the mess in which the House of 
Lords found itself. Even a child knows the maxim, ‘You broke it— you fix it’…We seem…to be stuck in 
a game of legal pass-the-parcel in which the music never stops’.94 If the law is not to remain in 
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stalemate, judicial adjustment can — and should — be the only productive way forward. The 
reluctance of the courts to develop the law is an inertia at odds with the nature of the common law 
as a jurisprudential body developed over time by the judiciary to reflect the needs of the 
contemporary age.95 Indeed, as noted in Donoghue itself, the very quality of attentiveness to context 
and ability to respond to it lies at the very heart of the common law: ‘[t]he conception of legal 
responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of 
judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life.’96 In the light of the 
legislature’s explicit preference for judicial development, the more liberal stance of the lower courts 
and the persuasive precedent of the Australian approach and the changing technological field, there 
is arguably a mandate for judge-led reform and the courts should take their cue accordingly. As Lord 
Kerr (albeit dissenting) has recently observed of Alcock in Michael:  
 
It is, I believe, important to be alive to the true nature of these decisions, especially when one 
comes to consider the precedent value of earlier cases in which such judgments have been 
made. A decision based on what is considered to be correct legal principle cannot be lightly 
set aside in subsequent cases where the same legal principle is in play. By contrast, a decision 
which is not the product of, in the words of Lord Oliver, “any logical process of analogical 
deduction” holds less sway, particularly if it does not accord with what the subsequent 
decision-maker considers to be the correct instinctive reaction to contemporaneous standards 
and conditions. Put bluntly, what one group of judges felt was the correct policy answer in 
2009, should not bind another group of judges, even as little as five years later.97  
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Given that wholesale reform would appear to be stretching the bounds of incrementalism, it should 
arguably be achieved by invoking the 1966 Practice Statement.98 The Statement allows for departure 
from established House of Lords and Supreme Court decisions where ‘too rigid adherence to 
precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development 
of the law’99 — precisely the situation that is broadly acknowledged by the judiciary and 
commentators alike to be the result of Alcock even before the challenges of new technology are 
considered. Abandoning physical and temporal proximity, direct and immediate perception by the 
unaided senses, and sudden shock, are reforms that could all be justified on the increasingly pressing 
policy grounds that the law needs to reflect contemporary technological reality. Such reform would 
also have the effect of more closely aligning the law with medical understandings of psychiatric 
damage which question the centrality of a ‘sudden’ shock and the primacy of any particular means 
by which the shock is caused. Moreover, abandoning the controls identified above would have the 
benefit of sparing the courts having to increasingly distort the ‘immediate aftermath’ concept as 
seen in Galli-Atkinson and Walters. Contrary to the concerns in Alcock, liability would not be 
unlimited in that it could still be sufficiently controlled by the remaining mechanisms of the higher 
foreseeability threshold, the requirement of psychiatric damage and proximity of relationship, as 
well as the requirements of causation and remoteness which could deal with cases of more 
protracted perception such those involving drawn-out illnesses or injuries. The rules on limitation 
would also provide a temporal cut-off point. Should these arguments not be sufficiently persuasive, 
the Australian experience arguably provides clear evidence that the removal of certain Alcock 
control mechanisms does not cause the floodgates to open, in that their courts have not been 
inundated with claims.  
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In relation to secondary victims’ claims for psychiatric damage, this article has argued that Alcock 
fails to provide a suitable legal framework for the present day for a number of reasons. The decision 
predates key technological developments and thus does not accurately describe the current state of 
the art. In the contemporary age, the unexpurgated filming and online viewing of extreme events is 
highly foreseeable to all concerned. Broadcasting and broadcasters have been transformed by the 
entry into the field of unregulated broadcasters transmitting graphic and unedited material with 
little or no effective editorial or ethical control. Such imagery readily reaches viewers on a range of 
highly sophisticated devices which can easily and clearly track specifically identified individuals and 
their suffering. The continued presumption of a singular television broadcaster obediently abiding by 
a code of ethics where identifiable suffering is not (and would not be) depicted is clearly open to 
challenge. The proliferation of high quality images online and the embedding of a heavily visual 
culture into everyday life make it increasingly unrealistic to exclude such claims by default, whilst 
other advances in biomedical and media technology also begin to blur the line between the ‘aided’ 
and ‘unaided senses’. As observed in the lower court in Alcock, the law to that point had been on an 
expansive trajectory and if, as observed in McLoughlin, it would be ‘impractical’ as well as ‘unjust’ to 
insist on direct and immediate perception of the event itself, then the logical development would 
surely be to expand as opposed to contract liability, particularly in the current age.  
 
Looking to the Australian jurisprudence as a guide, the article has sought to suggest that abandoning 
the requirements of sudden shock, direct and immediate perception, and proximity in time and 
space are not necessarily at odds with the underlying principles of the law and indeed would make it 
more fitting for the modern age. It is arguably not a question of if, but rather when a case 
challenging Alcock’s stance on direct perception via the unaided senses will be made, and the law 
must reflect modern realities. As noted in Taylor, ‘In this area of law, the perception of the ordinary 
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reasonable person matters. That is because where the boundaries of proximity are drawn in this 
difficult area should, so far as possible, reflect what the ordinary reasonable person would regard as 
acceptable.’100 Arguably, contemporary litigants — the ordinary and reasonable people for whom 
the law of negligence must make sense — increasingly live their lives online. Such litigants will be 
increasingly dismayed and frustrated by a legal system that permits papers to be served via 
Facebook and defamation claims to be based on Twitter, but that would doggedly continue to insist 
on sudden shock, proximity in time and space to the incident, and the direct perception of horrifying 
events for the purposes of psychiatric damage.101 If, as the courts have elsewhere been at pains to 
emphasise, the contemporary understanding of psychiatric damage should not lag behind medical 
knowledge,102 then arguably the framing of the law should equally avoid lagging behind 
developments in media technology. As Kirby P has commented in the Australian case of 
Campbelltown City Council v Mackay: ‘The causes of action at common law should, in my opinion, be 
released from subservience to 19th century science’.103 Echoing his sentiments in the context of 
domestic recovery for psychiatric damage, it is concluded that by abandoning the requirements of 
direct perception by the unaided senses, sudden shock and proximity in time and space, the law can 
be released from subservience to 20th Century technology and recognise the realities of the 21st.  
                                                          
100
 Taylor, fn 92 above, §30 (Master of the Rolls). 
101
 See http://www.access-legal.co.uk/legal-news/papers-served-facebook-lu-3384.htm  ; The Lord McAlpine of 
West Green v Sally Bercow [2013] EWCA Civ 1342. 
102
 Page, fn 11 above. 
103
 Campbelltown City Council v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501, 503, see discussion in Handford fn 44 above.  
